Από τον Spinoza στον Rousseau: Από τη γεωμετρική ηθική στην έννοια του ηθικού υποκειμένου
Γρηγοροπούλου , Βασιλική
In the history of philosophy from Spinoza to Kant the problem arises concerning the transition from the production of systems ordine geometrico to formulating the concept of the autonomous subject, which entails a rethinking of the terms and the limits of theoretical and practical Reason. The present paper undertakes to examine this historical question through the medium of the relation between Spinoza and Rousseau. To summarize, what we shall endeavour to maintain is that between Spinoza and Rousseau significant conceptual modifications took place, primarily because of a change in the situational condition of humans: whereas in Spinoza's system the human being was a part of nature and subject to natural laws, in the theory of Rousseau human will occupies centre stage. Nevertheless, although there is a different «centre of gravity» in the respective theoretical constructs of the two thinkers, what is common to both is the pursuit of the good. In Spinoza its foundations are in the metaphysical presuppositions of his epistemology; in Rousseau the good is posited by the political subject through institutionalization of the Republic. Whereas in Spinoza the relation between knowledge and action is represented as symmetrical, in Rousseau emphasis is placed on questions of practical order. Whereas Spinoza focuses on the idea of beatitudo of the wise man, in Rousseau the focus is on autonomy, freedom as self-legislation. As elaborated in this study, the concept of the good will be exposed to attempted redefinition by Spinoza in terms of its relations to the Aristotelian tradition: the good is not an objective, but a dynamic immanent principle, reflected from a variety of viewpoints. The concept of the good is also reformulated subsequently by Rousseau, who posits it as an object of the general will that is valid as a law, without for all that specifying its content in advance. Notwithstanding the differences between the two thinkers, points in common can be identified in their anthropology, as is analyzed in this article, on the basis of which it becomes possible to assert that a common aspiration for them was to link and to reconcile love of self, the good for each individual, with the common good, without abolishing the difference between these two outlooks.