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Η κριτική του Νικολάου Καβάσιλα στη θεωρία του πυρρωνισμού και στους «πέντε περί τον Αγρίππαν τρόπους»
Δελλής, Ι. Γ.
In this paper we have analyzed in detail a text of N. Cavasilas titled «Κατά των λεγομένων περί του κριτηρίου της αληθείας, ει έστι παρά Πύρρωνος του καταράτου». The analysis has been based on the singular edition of Cavasilas΄ text, edited by R. Radermacher. The text has not been researched up today, as far as we are able to know. This essay of Cavasilas is closely related with the Pyrrhonism theory and as we have proved with the «πέντε των περί τον Αγρίππαν τρόπους» (D. L., IX, 88). After a short reference on the history of Scepticism theory in the Byzantine Literature up to 14th century we proved that Cavasilas wrote this text to support the views of Hesychasm against the attack of Barlaam of Calabria. The later one refused the possibility of knowing the God as Hesychasts believed. Barlaam agreed to this with the ancient Sceptics (see Sexctus, PH, III, 4). So Cavasilas attacks Scepticism in order ot criticize and reject the views of Barlaam. With this attitude towards the ancient Scepticism for subjects of religion΄s beliefs, Cavasilas takes precedence of Pierre Bayle. He was the one wrote later «Pyrrhonism is dangerous in relation to this divine science» (See: Historical and Critical Dictionary, selections tr. R. Popkin, Pyrrho, remark B). Cavasilas rejects the Pyrrhonism theory and the five Modes of Agrippa after dhaving examined them one by one: a) The mode deriving from dispute (από διαφωνίας). b) The mode throwing one back ad infinitivum (εις άπειρον εκβάλλοντα). c) Τhe mode deriving from relativity (τον πρός τι). d) The hypothetical mode (τον εξ υποθέσεως). e) Reciprocale inference (διαλληλίας τρόπον). For each of these modes he develops a serie of arguments based on Aristotelian logic, that he knows. In this way he proves the error of Sceptics and supports the view that there is possibility of knowledge as well as criterion of truth. Thus he reinforces the view of Hesychasts.
Academy of Athens
