Υποκειμενισμός και σχετικισμός στο πρώιμο έργο του Witgenstein: «Η διερεύνηση μιας υπόθεσης»
It has been assumed by certain commentators that Wittgenstein had been led to subjectivity and relativity during the Tractatus period. Besides, it was suggested that he was a solipsist and, in the ethical field, a relativist. Our critique of those false assumptions is split into two parts. In the first part we maintain that Wittgenstein was definitely not a solipsist, because: a) solipsism is incompatible with the picture theory and the doctrine of automatic communication through language, which is inherent in the picture theory, b) the solipsistic interpretation of the Tractatus is based on an attempt to say in words what the Tractatian objects really are, an approach alien both to Wittgestein΄s philosophy and to his inner intentions, c) Wittgenstein΄s system demonstrates his concern to give an objective interpretation of reality, one that can be appropriate to all possible worlds. Far from being a traditional solipsist, Wittgenstein finds solipsism and realism compatible. His so-called solipsism becomes thus «objective». This paradoxical solution is achieved through the elimination of the thinking subject: the self, the subject in the Tractatus has shrunk into an extensionless point, a limit of the world. There remains consequently no subject to interfere with pure reality: the world΄s «mineness» replaces the self. In the second part we deal with the problem of ethical relativity. We maintain that the doctrine of silence, among others, does not imply the relativity of ethical judgements or value-judgements in general. On the contrary: by placing all values out of the realm of «reality», Wittgenstein did not intended to reduce their objectivity, but to ensure that they are not casual. Only facts are casual and values are not facts. The philosopher΄s job is not to decide whether an ethical proposition is valid or not, but simply to analyse its meaning. Finally, the assumption is proved false on the grounds of the universal unity preached by Wittgenstein: the willing subject is eliminated within the objective world of facts — the will is identified with the world.