δείτε την πρωτότυπη σελίδα τεκμηρίου στον ιστότοπο του αποθετηρίου του φορέα για περισσότερες πληροφορίες και για να δείτε όλα τα ψηφιακά αρχεία του τεκμηρίου*
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In this paper an attempt is being made to examine the epistemology of the value judgements and propositions of the social sciences in particular in comparison to that of the sciences of nature. In the degree to which the value element is a substantive and constitutive part of social action and of social institutions, such an element definitely enters into the formulation of social action propositions, the tendency to challenge the objectivity of such propositions and to consider them as wrong ones is erroneous. In addition, in the degree to which the value judgement in social science΄s propositions is indispensable, there also emerged the impossibility for their definitely classification as either false or true. Within such a frame of analysis, we cannot claim that something is false unless we possess that which is true, and therefore, the distorted or ideological nature of knowledge (which the sociology of knowl¬edge proclaims) seems to be meaningless. Within a probability frame of reference, the degree to which causal inferences could be made to explain and predict a group of events, sociological laws tend predominately to appear as statistical hypotheses or statistical regularities in terms of motives and values important for social action. Yet, the selection of a causal process seems to depend on social scientist΄s convictions and value judgements — as it happens in the realm of social sciences as well. Important seems to be the distinction between value judgements and propositions on facts. Whether a person has a certain value is a proposition of fact, while, on the other hand, the epistemological validity of such value judgements is the problem to be solved. Finally, the attempt to identify proposition΄s objectivity with truth itself, seems to transform truth into a predicate of propositions. Science can not contribute to the conformation of the categorical value structure, while, on the other hand, some non-conditional value judgements have to be made in both, social and physical sciences in terms with the objectivity of their propositions. Yet, hypothesis testing can not be considered as in equivocal, while the social science in particular has to preserve a degree of open mind to modifications achieved through the freedom of actors and the unpredictable as well.
*Η εύρυθμη και αδιάλειπτη λειτουργία των διαδικτυακών διευθύνσεων των συλλογών (ψηφιακό αρχείο, καρτέλα τεκμηρίου στο αποθετήριο) είναι αποκλειστική ευθύνη των φορέων περιεχομένου.
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